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  Opposite ends of the globe 
 
  It appears that no two global warming policies on earth are farther 
apart than the White House and 10 Downing Street. In 2001, President G.W. 
Bush announced his opposition to binding constraints on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. In his letter of opposition, he stated, “I oppose the Kyoto 
Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major 
population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would 
cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.” This policy, much like the war in 
Iraq, was undertaken with no discernible economic analysis.2 
 
  In stark contrast, the British government in November 2006 presented a 
comprehensive new study, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
                                              
1 The author is grateful for helpful comments by Scott Barrett, William Brainard, 
Partha Dasgupta, Robert Stavins, Nicholas Stern, and John Weyant. 
 
2 Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, March 
13, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html 
(downloaded November 13, 2006). There is no record of a fact sheet or other 
economic analysis accompanying the letter. The Bush Administration’s economic 
analysis was contained in the 2002 Economic Report of the President and the Council of 
Economic Advisers, published almost a year after President Bush’s letter to the 
Senators. The Economic Report’s analysis suggests that the Kyoto Protocol is costly, 
but its analysis does not show that binding action is economically unwarranted. 
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(hereafter the Review).3 Prime Minister Tony Blair painted a dark picture for 
the globe at its unveiling, “It is not in doubt that if the science is right, the 
consequences for our planet are literally disastrous…. [W]ithout radical 
international measures to reduce carbon emissions within the next 10 to 15 
years, there is compelling evidence to suggest we might lose the chance to 
control temperature rises.”4 
 
  The summary in the Review was equally stark: “[T]he Review estimates 
that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be 
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a 
wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of 
damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more.… Our actions now and over the 
coming decades could create risks … on a scale similar to those associated 
with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th 
century.”5  
 
  These results are dramatically different from earlier economic models 
that use the same basic data and analytical structure. One of the major 
findings in the economics of climate change has been that efficient or 
“optimal” economic policies to slow climate change involve modest rates of 
emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the 
                                              
3 All citations in this note were from the online version at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/ 
sternreview_index.cfm (downloaded various dates, November 2006). 
 
4 PM's comments at launch of Stern Review, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page10300.asp (downloaded November 13, 2006). 
 
5 Review, Summary of Conclusions. 
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medium and long term. We might call this the climate-policy ramp, in which 
policies to slow global warming increasingly tighten or ramp up over time.6  
 
  While seemingly counterintuitive, the findings about the climate-policy 
ramp have survived the tests of multiple alternative modeling strategies, 
different climate goals, alternative specifications of the scientific modules, and 
more than a decade of revisions in integrated assessment models. The logic of 
the climate-policy ramp is straightforward. In a world where capital is 
productive, the highest-return investments are primarily in tangible, 
technological, and human capital, including research and development in 
low-carbon-emissions technologies. As societies become richer in the coming 
decades, it becomes efficient to shift investments toward policies that intensify 
the pace of emissions reductions and otherwise slow GHG emissions. The 
exact mix and timing of emissions reductions depends upon details of costs, 
damages, and the extent to which climate change and damages are 
irreversible. 
  
  While scientists have sounded many somber warnings about the long-
term peril of unchecked climate change,7 the Review attempts to justify strong 
                                              
6 This strategy was one of the major conclusions in a review of integrated-assessment 
models: “Perhaps the most surprising result is the consensus that given calibrated 
interest rates and low future economic growth, modest controls are generally 
optimal.” David L. Kelly and Charles D. Kolstad, Integrated Assessment Models For 
Climate Change Control,” Henk Folmer and Tom Tietenberg (eds.), International 
Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000: A Survey of Current Issues, 
Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 1999. 
 
7 For a recent warning, see James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Ken Lo, David 
W. Lea, and Martin Medina-Elizade Global temperature change, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (US), 103, 2006, pp. 14288-14293. 
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current action in a cost-benefit economic framework.8 Because it has 
conclusions that are so different from most economic studies, the present note 
examines the reasons for this major difference. Is this radical revision of 
global-warming economics warranted? 
 
  Overview of the Review 
 
  I will not summarize the basic findings of the Review – a clear summary 
is found on its website. Instead, I begin with five summary reactions. First, the 
Review is an impressive document, buttressed by more than a dozen 
background studies. There is little new science or economics here, but it 
provides many new syntheses of the extensive and rapidly growing literature. 
While not as balanced and ponderously reviewed as the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it is much more current 
than the latest IPCC report, published in 2001.9 For those seriously interested 
in global warming, it is worth a few days’ study. 
 
  Second, while I question some of the Review’s modeling and economic 
assumptions, its results are fundamentally correct in sign if not in size. The 
approach taken in the Review – selecting climate-change policies with an eye 
to balancing economic needs with environmental dangers – is solidly 
grounded in mainstream economic analysis. By linking climate-change 
policies to both economic and environmental objectives, the Review has 
                                              
8 The early precursor of this Review is the study by William R. Cline, The Economics 
of Global Warming, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1992. 
 
9 Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, 
J. T. Houghton, Y. Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P. J. van der Linden, and D. Xiaosu, 
eds., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.   5 
corrected one of the fundamental flaws of the Kyoto Protocol, which had no 
such linkage. By contrast, the parallel analysis of the Bush Administration, 
cited in footnote 2 above, provided no support for the Bush Administration’s 
rejection of binding emissions constraints on GHG emissions. 
 
 Third,  the  Review should be viewed as a political document. Its chief 
author is Sir Nicholas Stern, who has had a distinguished career in academic 
and government positions. Until 1993, he was a public-finance economist in 
British universities specializing in taxation and economic development; today, 
he is Head of the Government Economics Service and Adviser to the 
Government. The disciplinary background of a public-finance economist is the 
leitmotiv running through the chapters. However, it is not an academic study. 
Like most government reports, the Review was published without an appraisal 
of methods and assumptions by independent outside experts. But even the 
analysis of HM Government needs peer review. 
 
  The fourth comment concerns the Review’s emphasis on the need for 
increasing the price of carbon emissions. The Review summarizes its 
discussion here as follows, “Creating a transparent and comparable carbon 
price signal around the world is an urgent challenge for international 
collective action.” In plain English, the Review argues that it is critical to have a 
harmonized carbon tax or similar regulatory device both to provide incentives 
to individual firms and households and to stimulate research and 
development in low-carbon technologies. Carbon prices must be raised to 
transmit the social costs of GHG emissions to the everyday decisions of 
billions of firms and people. This simple yet inconvenient economic insight is 
virtually absent from most political discussions of climate change policy 
(including the marathon slide show by Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth).   6 
 
  But these points are not the nub of the matter. Rather, and this is the 
final comment, the Review’s radical revision arises because of an extreme 
assumption about discounting. Discounting is a factor in climate-change 
policy – indeed in all investment decisions – which involves the relative 
weight of future and present payoffs. At first blush, this area would appear a 
technicality that should properly be left to abstruse treatises and graduate 
courses in economics. Unfortunately, it cannot be buried in a footnote, for 
discounting is the central to the radical revision. The Review proposes using a 
social discount rate that is essentially zero. Combined with other assumptions, 
this magnifies enormously impacts in the distant future and rationalizes deep 
cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today. If we were to 
substitute more conventional discount rates used in other global-warming 
analyses, by governments, by consumers, or by businesses, the Review’s 
dramatic results would disappear, and we would come back to the climate-
policy ramp described above. The balance of this discussion focuses on this 
central issue. 
 
  The social discount rate: concepts and assumptions 
 
  Discounting involves a concept called the pure rate of social time 
preference – I will call this “the social discount rate” for short. The social 
discount rate is a parameter that measures the importance of the welfare of 
future generations relative to the present. It is calculated in percent per year, 
like an interest rate, but refers to the discount in future “utility” or welfare, 
not future goods or dollars. A zero social discount rate means that future 
generations into the indefinite future are treated equally with present 
generations; a positive social discount rate means that the welfares of future   7 
generations are reduced or “discounted” compared to nearer generations. 
Philosophers and economists have conducted vigorous debates about how to 
apply social discount rates in areas as diverse as economic growth, climate 
change, energy policy, nuclear waste, major infrastructure programs such as 
levees, and reparations for slavery.10 
 
  Discussions about discount rates need to respect the distinction 
between the social discount rate and the discount rate on goods. The former 
refers to the relative weights on different people or generations and is the 
major source of concern in this note. The latter refers to discounts on bundles 
of goods and is measured as a “real interest rate.” I discuss the connection 
between these two concepts below.   
  
  The sections that follow examine the philosophical arguments about 
intergenerational equity, how discounting affects the measurement of 
damages, the role of discounting in economic modeling of climate change, 
saving behavior, and behavior under uncertainty.  
 
                                              
10 Many of the issues involved is discounting, particularly relating to climate change, 
are discussed in the different studies in Paul Portney and John Weyant, Discounting 
and Intergenerational Equity, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1999. Note 
that the pure rate of social time preference differs from the real interest rate or the 
discount rate on goods and services, which is in principle observed in the market 
place. A useful summary is contained in K. J. Arrow, W. Cline, K.G. Maler, M. 
Munasinghe, R. Squitieri, and J. Stiglitz, “Intertemporal equity, discounting and 
economic efficiency,” in Climate Change 1995—Economic and Social Dimensions of 
Climate Change, edited by J. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. Haites, 1996, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 125–44.   
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  Philosophical questions about the social discount rate 
 
  At the outset, we should recall the warning that Tjalling Koopmans 
gave in his pathbreaking analysis of discounting in growth theory. He wrote, 
“[T]he problem of optimal growth is too complicated, or at least too 
unfamiliar, for one to feel comfortable in making an entirely a priori choice of 
[a social discount rate] before one knows the implications of alternative 
choices.”11 This conclusion applies with even greater force in global warming 
models, which have much greater complexity than the simple, deterministic, 
stationary, two-input models that Koopmans analyzed. 
 
 The  Review argues that it is indefensible to make long-term decisions 
with a positive social discount rate. The conclusion of the approach is the 
following, “The argument … and that of many other economists and 
philosophers who have examined these long-run, ethical issues, is that [a 
positive social discount rate] is relevant only to account for the exogenous 
possibility of extinction.” (Annex to Chapter 2, p. 52) The argument is that a 
high social discount rate would lead societies to ignore large costs that occur 
in the distant future. The actual social discount rate used in the Review is 0.1 
percent per year, which is only vaguely justified by extinction estimates; for 
our purposes, it can be treated as near-zero. 
                                              
11 Tjalling C. Koopmans, “On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth,” in 
Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia 28, 1, Semaine D'Etude sur Le Role de 
L'analyse Econometrique dans la Formulation de Plans de Developpement, 1965, pp. 1-75 
(available for download at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/p_koopmans.htm.) 
Zero discounting leads to deep mathematical problems such as non-convergence of 
the objective function and incompleteness of the functional. For the analytical 
background, see also Frank Ramsey, “A Mathematical Theory of Saving,” Economic 
Journal, 1928, 38, pp. 543–559; David Cass, “Optimum Growth in an Aggregative 
Model of Capital Accumulation,” Review of Economic Studies, 1965, 32, pp. 233–240.  
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  The logic behind the Review’s social welfare function is not as conclusive 
as it claims. The Review argues that fundamental ethics require 
intergenerational neutrality using an additive separable logarithmic utility 
function. Quite another ethical stance would be to hold that each generation 
should leave at least as much total societal capital (tangible, natural, human, 
and technological) as it inherited. This would admit a wide array of social 
discount rates. A third alternative would be a Rawlsian perspective that 
societies should maximize the economic well-being of the poorest generation. 
Under this policy, current consumption would increase sharply to reflect likely 
future improvements in productivity. Yet a fourth perspective would be a 
precautionary (minimax) principle in which societies maximize the minimum 
consumption along the riskiest path; this might involve stockpiling vaccines, 
grain, oil, and water in contemplation of possible plagues and famines. 
Without choosing among these positions, it should be clear that alternative 
ethical perspectives are possible. Moreover, as I suggest below, alternative 
perspectives provide vastly different prescriptions about desirable climate-
change policies. 
 
Even if a low social discount is chosen, a second issue arises in the 
calibration of the social discount rate to actual macroeconomic. Behind the 
Review’s modeling is the assumption that the world economy is in long-run 
equilibrium of a Ramsey optimal growth model. In a Ramsey equilibrium 
with stable population, there are two observables – the rate of return on 
capital and the rate of growth of consumption; and there are two normative 
parameters – the social discount rate and the curvature of the utility function 
(more precisely, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption). A 
realistic analysis would also need to account for distortions in the tax system,   10
for uncertainties and risk premiums, and for the equity-premium puzzle, but 
these complications can be ignored in the present context. 
 
The Review assumes a relatively low curvature parameter (the 
logarithmic utility function) along with the near-zero social discount rate. 
However, in calibrating a growth model, the social discount rate and the 
curvature parameter cannot be chosen independently if the model is designed 
to match observable variables. A low curvature (such as in the logarithmic 
utility function) implies a relatively high social discount rate. A high 
curvature (represented by a high degree of risk aversion or a high aversion to 
intergenerational inequality) implies a low or even negative social discount 
rate. It turns out that the calibration of the utility function makes an enormous 
difference to the results in global-warming models, as I show in the modeling 
section below. 
 
Measuring impacts with near-zero discounting 
 
  With these analytical points behind us, I next discuss the Review’s 
estimates of the aggregate economic impacts. The Review concludes, “Putting 
these three factors together would probably increase the cost of climate 
change to the equivalent of a 20% cut in per-capita consumption, now and 
forever.” This frightening statement suggests that the globe is perilously close 
to driving off a climatic cliff in the very near future. However, this is an 
unusual definition of consumption losses, and when the Review says that there 
are substantial losses “now,” this does not mean “today.” The measure of 
consumption used is the “balanced growth equivalents” of consumption. 
Roughly speaking, with low discounting, this is the certainty equivalent of the 
average annual consumption loss over the indefinite future. The measure is   11
akin to an annuity. In fact, the Review’s estimate of the output loss now, as in 
“today,” appears to be zero. 
 
  If we look inside the impact boxes, we find some strange things. The 
damage estimates are much higher than the standard estimates in the impact 
literature. This probably occurs because of assumptions that tilt up the 
damage curve: rapid economic growth forever, high economic damage 
estimates, high climatic impacts of GHG accumulation, catastrophic risks, 
adverse health impacts, yet higher sensitivity of the climate system, and an 
adjustment for inequality across countries. Additionally, the Review drew 
selectively from studies, emphasizing those with high damage estimates, 
some of which are highly speculative. For example, the Review used estimates 
from the study of Nordhaus and Boyer (see footnote 12 below) that projected 
damages way beyond 2100; however, those authors noted that projections 
beyond 2100 were particularly unreliable. 
 
  However, the major point is that these impacts are far into the future, 
and the calculations depend critically upon the assumption of low 
discounting. Take as an example the high-climate scenario with catastrophic 
and non-market impacts. For this case, the mean losses are less than 1 percent 
of world output in 2050, 2.9 percent in 2100, and 13.8 percent in 2200 (see 
Figure 6.5d). Yet this somehow turns into a mean annual impact of 14.4 
percent shown in Table 6.1, and after a few other gloomy ingredients are 
stirred in, it becomes the “20% cut in per-capita consumption, now and 
forever.”  
 
  How do damages, which average around 5 percent of output over the 
next two centuries turn into a 14.4 percent reduction in consumption now and   12
forever? The answer lies in the way that near-zero discounting magnifies 
distant impacts. With near-zero discounting, the low damages in the next two 
centuries get overwhelmed by the long-term average over many centuries. We 
can illustrate using the Review’s model discussed in Box 6.3. Suppose that 
scientists discover that that a wrinkle in the climatic system will cause 
damages equal to 0.01 percent of output starting in 2200 and continuing at 
that rate thereafter.  
 
  How large a one-time investment would be justified today to remove the 
wrinkle starting after two centuries? The answer is that a payment of 15 percent 
of world consumption today (approximately $7 trillion) would pass the 
Review’s cost-benefit test. This seems completely absurd. The bizarre result 
arises because the value of the future consumption stream is so high with 
near-zero discounting that we would trade off a large fraction of today’s 
income to increase a far-future income stream by a very tiny fraction. This 
bizarre implication reminds us of Koopmans’s warning quoted above to 
proceed cautiously to accept theoretical assumptions about discounting before 
examining their full consequences. 
 
  Hence, the damage puzzle is resolved. The large damages from global 
warming reflect large and speculative damages in the far-distant future; the 
impacts now, as in today, are small; and, as I will suggest below, the 20 
percent cut in consumption from global-warming might be reduced by an 
order of magnitude if alternative assumptions about discounting are used. 
   13
  Economic modeling with low discount rates 
 
  I next apply these points in an empirical model of the economics of 
global warming. To foreshadow the result, these calculations show that the 
assumption of a near-zero social discount rate drives most of the economic 
results in the Review.  
 
  It is virtually impossible for mortals outside the group that did the 
modeling to understand the detailed results of the Review. It would involve 
studying the economics and geophysics in several chapters, taking apart a 
complex analysis (the PAGE model), and examining the derivation and 
implications of each of the economic and scientific judgments. 
 
The alternative approach followed here is to use a small and well-
documented model of the economics of climate change to estimate the optimal 
policy, and then to make parameter adjustments to parallel assumptions made 
in the Review. For this purpose, I use the “DICE model,” which is an acronym 
for a Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy. This model, 
developed in the early 1990s, uses a simple dynamic representation of the 
scientific and economic links among population, technological change, GHG 
emissions, concentrations, climate change, and damages. The analytical 
structure of the DICE model is identical to that in the Review. DICE calculates 
the paths of capital investment and GHG reductions that maximize a social 
welfare function, where the social welfare function is the discounted sum of 
population-weighted utilities of per capita consumption. The DICE model 
assumes a pure rate of social time preference starting at 3 percent per year and 
declining slowly to about 1 percent per year in 300 years. The social discount   14
rate was chosen to be consistent with a logarithmic utility function, market 
interest rates, and rates of private and public saving and investment. 12 
 
  For this analysis, I have updated the DICE model to 2005 data, 
economics, science, and 2006 prices.13 I then make three runs, which are 
explained as we proceed: 
 
 Run  1.  Optimal climate change policy in the DICE-2006 model 
  Run 2. Optimal climate change using the Stern Review zero discount rate 
  Run 3. Optimal climate change using a recalibrated zero discount rate 
 
   Run 1. Run 1 is the Optimal climate change policy in DICE-2006. This run 
takes the DICE-2006 model and calculates the optimal trajectory of climate 
change policies as described above. This calculation leads to an optimal 
carbon price in 2005 of $17.12 per ton C, rising over time to $84 in 2050 and 
$270 in 2100. (The “optimal carbon price,” or carbon tax, sometimes called the 
“social cost of carbon,” is the calculated price of carbon emissions that will 
balance the incremental costs of reducing carbon emissions with the 
                                              
12 Results and documentation of the DICE model are provided in William Nordhaus, 
“An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases,” Science, vol. 258, 
November 20, 1992, pp. 1315-1319; William Nordhaus, Managing the Global Commons: 
The Economics of Climate Change, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994; William 
Nordhaus and Zili Yang “A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of 
Alternative Climate-Change Strategies,”, American Economic Review, vol. 86, No. 4, 
September 1996, pp. 741-765; William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the 
World: Economic Modeling of Global Warming, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2000; 
William Nordhaus, “Global Warming Economics,” Science, November 9, 2001, vol. 
294, no. 5545, pp. 1283-1284.  
 
13 Documentation of the changes in the DICE-2006 model and the GAMS computer 
program for the DICE-2006 model are provided in William D. Nordhaus, 
“Documentation for DICE-2006, November 2006 round,” November 17, 2006, 
available at www.nordhaus.econ.yale.edu , under “Recent Stuff.” 
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incremental benefits of reducing climate damages.) The optimal rate of 
emissions reduction is 6 percent in 2005, 14 percent in 2050, and 25 percent in 
2100.14 This optimized path leads to a projected global temperature increase 
from 2000 to 2100 of around 1.8 degrees C. While the findings of such 
mainstream economic assessments may not satisfy the most ardent 
environmentalists, if followed they would go far beyond current global 
emissions reductions and would be a good first step on a journey of many 
miles. 
 
  Run 2. The results of the standard DICE model just discussed are 
completely different from those in the Review. The Review recommends a 
social cost of carbon of $311 per ton C. This number is almost 20 times the 
DICE model result. Based on calculations made in earlier publications (see 
footnote 12), it seems likely that the major reason for the Review’s sharp 
emissions reductions and high carbon price is the low social discount rate. I 
therefore calculated run 2, Optimal climate change using the Stern Review zero 
discount rate. The assumptions are the same as Run 1 except that the social 
discount rate is changed to 0.1 percent per year. This dramatically changes the 
trajectory of climate-change policy. The 2005 optimal carbon price in the DICE 
model rises from $17.12 in Run 1 to $159 per ton C in Run 2.15 Efficient 
emissions reductions in Run 2 are much larger – with emissions reductions of 
                                              
14  The future numbers are the solutions to the model based on current information 
and provide estimates of optimal future policies under current estimates of 
parameters. They are not decisions that are taken today. They should be revised over 
time as new scientific and economic information becomes available. 
15 The social cost of carbon estimated in the Review is approximately two times 
higher than the number calculated in Run 2. Because different models are used, it is 
not possible to identify reasons for the discrepancy. Modeling results are extremely 
sensitive to parameter changes when the discount rate is near-zero. 
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50 percent in 2015 – because future damages are in effect treated as occurring 
today. The climate-policy ramp flattens out. 
 
Run 3.An earlier section noted that alternative calibrations of the social 
welfare function are consistent with observable variables. So the final run is 
one in which assumes a low social discount rate but where the curvature 
parameter is calibrated so that the economic growth path conforms to 
observable variables. Some history might be helpful here. When the DICE 
model was constructed fifteen years ago, I assumed logarithmic utility for 
computational reasons – alternative utility functions would not converge 
numerically. This calibration led to a social discount rate of 3 percent per year, 
which was calibrated to match the growth of consumption, savings rates, and 
market rates of return on capital. Because of improvements in computers and 
software, we can now easily calibrate alterative utility functions. Experiments 
with the DICE-2006 model indicate that a social discount rate of 0.1 percent 
per year is consistent with a utility curvature parameter of 2.25. However, the 
Review’s social discount rate of 0.1 percent per year is inconsistent with its 
utility curvature assumption of 1.16 The Review’s calibration gives too low a 
rate of return and too high a savings rate compared to macroeconomic data, 
                                              
16 The discussion in the text assumes zero population growth. More generally, the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans steady-state optimal growth equilibrium equation is  
r = ρ +  αg + n, where r = the marginal product of capital, ρ = social discount rate, 
α = elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, g = growth of per capita 
consumption, and n = rate of growth of population. Conceptually, the marginal 
product of capital has the same units as the real interest rate, but entirely different 
units from the social discount rate. To apply this equilibrium condition, assume that 
the observable variables (in rates per year) are r = 0.05, n = 0.00, and g = 0.02. For this 
simplest equation, if we assume that the social discount rate is ρ = 0 per year, then α 
= 2.5. If we take the log-linear utility function of the Review together with the 
observable variables in this footnote, then this implies that ρ = 0.03 per year. The 
calibrations in DICE-2006 are slightly different from these equilibrium calculations 
because of positive population growth and non-constant consumption growth, but 
these equilibrium calculations given the flavor of the results.   17
but the alternative calibration proposed here fits the macroeconomic data 
underlying the DICE model. 
 
We can now rerun the DICE-2006 model with the near-zero social 
discount rate and the associated calibrated curvature parameter derived in the 
last paragraph. This is Run 3, Optimal climate change with recalibrated zero 
discount rate. Run 3 looks very similar to Run 1, the standard DICE-2006 model 
optimal policy. The first-period social cost of carbon in Run 3 is $19.55 per ton 
C, slightly above Run 1. The recalibrated run looks nothing like Run 2, which 
is the run that reflects the Review’s assumption. How can it be that Run 3, with 
a near-zero social discount rate, looks so much like Run 1? The reason is that 
the recalibrated social discount rate in Run 3 maintains the assumption of 
productive capital, with a relatively high real interest rate in the near term. 
This high return means that the logic of the climate-policy ramp continues to 
hold even though the social choice function has been recalibrated to a zero 
social discount rate. This calibration removes the cost-benefit dilemmas just 
discussed as well as the savings and uncertainty problems discussed in the 
next two sections. 
 
  Implications for saving and investment 
 
  I return for the balance of this note to the Review’s assumptions on both 
social discount rate and utility curvature (the assumptions that underlie Run 
2). One surprising implication of the Review’s social discount rate is the effect 
on consumption and saving. If the Review’s philosophy were adopted as a 
general policy, it would produce much higher overall saving as compared 
with today. In Run 2 (Optimization with Stern discount parameter), the global net 
savings rate almost doubles compared to the historical numbers or Run 1. This   18
implies that global consumption would be reduced by about 14 percent, 
requiring a reduction of $6 trillion per year in current consumption.  
 
  Where would the consumption cuts come from? From India and Africa? 
That hardly seems equitable. The higher investment would be more than five 
times total overseas development aid of all countries today. Perhaps the 
consumption should come from the wasteful Americans? This would be four-
fifths of current levels of consumption and many times the decline in the 
Great Depression. 
 
  Aside from the question of who pays, we might wonder whether such a 
large decline in current consumption today is desirable in a world where 
average consumption is growing rapidly. The Review projects that per capita 
consumption will grow at 1.3 percent per year over the next two centuries (p. 
162). In 2006 dollars, this means that today’s per capita consumption of $7,600 
would grow to $94,000 in 2200. Here perhaps is a shard of hope for the globe. 
  
However, this growth also means that future climatic damages will 
come out of a much higher level of income. For example, the high-damage 
case is associated with a 13.8 percent decline in consumption in 2200 as 
discussed above. This means that per capita consumption would grow from 
$7,800 today to only $81,000 in 2200. Hence, the Review advocates reducing 
current consumption to prevent the decline in consumption of future 
generations that it projects to be much richer than today. While this might be 
worth contemplating, it hardly seems ethically compelling. 
 
  Faced with these implications of the discounting assumption, advocates 
of the Review policy might propose a “dual-discounting” approach – limiting   19
the scope of the low social discount rate to climate policy. In other words, 
perhaps countries should choose global-warming policies assuming the near-
zero social discount rate, but leave the rest of the economy to operate with the 
present high social discount rate. While this seems an attractive possibility, it 
is in fact a roundabout way to slow climate change sharply. In effect, we are 
using a low social discount rate to “prevent dangerous interference with the 
climate system” (in the language of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change). If that is the reason, why not impose the limit directly? Instead of 
using the near-zero social discount rate as an analytic subterfuge to slow 
climate change, why not simply adopt policies that will directly keep climate 
change below the dangerous threshold? Limiting climate change directly is 
more efficient as well as more transparent. 
  
  Hair triggers and uncertainty 
 
 A  further  unattractive feature of the Review’s near-zero social discount 
rate is that it puts present decisions on a hair-trigger in response to far-future 
contingencies. Under conventional discounting, contingencies many centuries 
ahead have a tiny weight in today’s decisions. Decisions focus on the near 
future. With the Review’s discounting procedure, by contrast, present 
decisions become extremely sensitive to uncertain events in the distant future. 
 
We saw above how an infinitesimal impact on the post-2200 income 
stream could justify a large consumption sacrifice today. We can use the same 
example to illustrate how far-future uncertainties are magnified by low 
discount rates. Suppose that we suddenly learn that there is a 10 percent 
probability of the wrinkle in the climatic system that reduces the post-2200 
income stream by 0.01 percent. What insurance premium would be justified   20
today to reduce that probability to zero? With conventional discount rates, we 
would probably ignore any tiny wrinkle two or three centuries ahead. If we 
did a careful calculation using conventional discount rates, we would 
calculate a breakeven 0.0002 percent insurance premium to remove the year-
2200 contingency, and a 0.0000003 percent premium for the year-2400 
contingency. Moreover, these dollar premiums are small whether the 
probability is large or small. 
 
With the Review’s near-zero discount rate, offsetting the low-probability 
wrinkle would be worth an insurance premium today of almost 2 percent of 
current income, or $1 trillion. We would pay almost the same amount if that 
threshold were to be crossed in 2400 rather than in 2200. Because the future is 
so greatly magnified by a near-zero social discount rate, policies would be 
virtually identical for different threshold dates. Moreover, a small refinement 
in the probability estimate would trigger a large change in the dollar premium 
we would pay. We are in effect forced to make current decisions about highly 
uncertain events in the distant future even though these estimates are highly 
speculative and are almost sure to be refined over the coming decades. 
 
  While this feature of low discounting might appear benign in climate-
change policy, we could imagine other areas where the implications could 
themselves be dangerous. Imagine the preventive war strategies that might be 
devised with low social discount rates. Countries might start wars today 
because of the possibility of nuclear proliferation a century ahead; or because 
of a potential adverse shift in the balance of power two centuries ahead; or 
because of speculative futuristic technologies three centuries ahead. It is not 
clear how long the globe could long survive the calculations and machinations   21
of zero-discount-rate military powers. This is yet a final example of a 
surprising implication of a low discount rate. 
 
  Summary verdict 
 
  How much and how fast should the globe reduce greenhouse-gas 
emissions? How should nations balance the costs of the reductions against the 
damages and dangers of climate change? The Stern Review answers these 
questions clearly and unambiguously: we need urgent, sharp, and immediate 
reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions. 
 
  I am reminded here of President Harry Truman’s complaint that his 
economists would always say, on the one hand this and on the other hand 
that. He wanted a one-handed economist. The Stern Review is a Prime 
Minister’s dream come true. It provides decisive and compelling answers 
instead of the dreaded conjectures, contingencies, and qualifications. 
 
  However, a closer look reveals that there is indeed another hand to 
these answers. The radical revision of the economics of climate change 
proposed by the Review does not arise from any new economics, science, or 
modeling. Rather, it depends decisively on the assumption of a near-zero 
social discount rate. The Review’s unambiguous conclusions about the need for 
extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of discounting 
assumptions that are consistent with today’s market place. So the central 
questions about global-warming policy – how much, how fast, and how costly 
– remain open. The Review informs but does not answer these fundamental 
questions. 